Stock Exchange Mergers and Market by Charles, Amélie et al.
Stock Exchange Mergers and Market
Ame´lie Charles, Olivier Darne´, Jae H. Kim, Etienne Redor
To cite this version:
Ame´lie Charles, Olivier Darne´, Jae H. Kim, Etienne Redor. Stock Exchange Mergers
and Market. Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis (Routledge), 2016, 48 (7), pp.576-589.
<10.1080/00036846.2015.1083090>. <hal-01238707>
HAL Id: hal-01238707
http://hal-audencia.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01238707
Submitted on 6 Dec 2015
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
Stock Exchange Mergers and Market
Eciency
Amelie CHARLESy
Audencia Nantes, School of Management
Olivier DARNEz
LEMNA, University of Nantes
Jae H. KIMx
Department of Finance, La Trobe Business School, La Trobe University
Etienne REDOR{
Audencia Nantes, School of Management
Olivier Darne gratefully acknowledge nancial support from the Chaire Finance of the University of
Nantes Research Foundation.
yAudencia Nantes, School of Management, 8 route de la Jonelire, 44312 Nantes Cedex 3. Email:
acharles@audencia.com.
zLEMNA, University of Nantes, IEMN{IAE, Chemin de la Censive du Tertre, BP 52231, 44322
Nantes, France. Email: olivier.darne@univ-nantes.fr.
xDepartment of Finance, La Trobe Business School, La Trobe University, VIC 3086, Australia. Email:
J.Kim@latrobe.edu.au.
{Audencia Nantes, School of Management, 8 route de la Jonelire, 44312 Nantes Cedex 3. Email:
eredor@audencia.com.
0
Abstract
The aim of this paper is to examine the impact of stock exchange mergers on
the degree of informational eciency. For this purpose, we apply the generalized
spectral shape test for the martingale dierence hypothesis to the stock returns
before and after the 31 domestic and cross-border mergers completed from 1997
to 2011. The test is conducted with moving sub-sample windows, allowing us to
detect the periods of (in)eciency, and thus to conduct a comparative analysis
for pre-merger and post-merger periods. We nd that higher levels of eciency
are less frequent than lower levels of eciency after a stock exchange merger. We
also nd that the impact on the level of eciency depends on a range of merger
characteristics such as the level of development, size, geographical diversication
and industrial diversication of stock exchange.
Keywords: Stock exchange mergers; Market eciency; Martingale dierence
sequence.
JEL Classication: C12; C14; G14; G15.
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1 Introduction
On February 2011, the NYSE Euronext Inc. and Deutsche Brse AG announced their
intentions to merge. This deal would have created the world's largest stock exchange
operator. Despite a competing hostile bid made by the NASDAQ and InterContinental
Exchange in April 2011, the oer was approved by the shareholders of both rms in July
2011. In December 2011, the U.S. Justice Department blessed the tie-up of the NYSE
Euronext and Deutsche Brse on the condition that the German exchange operators agreed
to sell its 31.5% stake in Direct Edge Holdings LLC. However, in early February 2012, the
European Commission decided to block the deal, with a concern that this merger would
have led to create a near monopoly on the international market of European derivatives.
As expected, NYSE Euronext Chairman, Jan-Michiel Hessels regretted that decision:
\Our merger would have created a high standard for transparency, stability and eciency
in the global capital markets, and we proposed signicant and tangible remedies designed
to address the European Commission's concerns with the transaction" (Business Wire,
2012).
Since the end of the 1990s, a number of stock exchanges have merged following the
trend towards demutualization { the process of converting exchanges from nonprot,
member-owned organizations to for-prot, investor-owned corporations (Aggarwal, 2002).
Aggarwal and Dahiya (2006) give four factors driving the demutualization of stock
exchanges: (i) deregulation of trading exchanges, (ii) growing conicts of interest
between existing owners, (iii) new developments in information technology and the rise
of electronic communication networks (ECNs) or alternative trading system (ATSs),
and (iv) shifting regulatory landscape. This process of demutualization has made
securities trading more competitive1, improved governance mechanisms, enhanced the
eectiveness of cross-border capital ows, and lowered the cost of equity nancing for
listed rms (Hasan et al., 2012b). These mergers and acquisitions (M&As) can be
viewed as the manifestation of consolidation of exchanges both geographically and across
products. The existing literature on M&As has investigated the eects of stock exchange
mergers from several perspectives such as liquidity (Lipson and Mortal, 2007; Nelsson,
2009) and exchange shareholders' value creation (Hasan et al., 2012a, 2012b). Some
1See Santos and Scheinkman (2001) and Amira and Muzere (2011) for discussion on competition
among exchanges.
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studies show that stock exchange M&As have increased the liquidity of the rms listed
on them, attracted market share, and reduced the trading cost (Arnold et al., 1999;
Nielsson, 2009). Further, M&As between two exchanges enable each of them to acquire
knowledge, skills, and governance mechanisms from the partnering exchange (Dessein,
2005; Gomes-Casseres et al., 2006). Moreover, the M&As can have dierent eects
according to some characteristics of the stock exchanges, such as stock exchange's level
of development (Rossi and Volpin, 2004; Bris and Cabolis, 2008; Chari et al., 2010),
size (Ben Slimane, 2012), geographical diversication (Kokkoris and Olivares-Caminal,
2008; Nielsson, 2009), and industrial diversication (Dessein, 2005; Gomes-Casseres et
al., 2006). For these reasons, M&As among stock exchanges can have an impact on
informational (weak-form) eciency.
The objective of this paper is to examine whether the M&As between stock exchanges
lead to a higher degree of informational eciency. Departing from the dichotomous view
of absolute market eciency, we resort to the notion of relative eciency (see Campbell et
al., 1997), where a stock market shows a level of market eciency higher or lower than the
other. In addition, we assume that the level of eciency changes over time, depending on
the prevailing market conditions and the psychology of market participants, which is the
main point of Lo's (2004) adaptive markets hypothesis. The evidence of time-changing
relative level of market eciency has been well-documented in the recent literature: see,
for example, Lim and Brooks (2010) and Kim et al. (2011). To the best of our knowledge,
Khan and Vieito (2012) is the only study that examines the impact of stock exchange
merger between the Portuguese Stock exchange and Euronext in 2002 on informational
market eciency.2 However, they employ the statistical tests that capture only linear
dependence of stock returns and do not use time-varying measures to evaluate the level
of market eciency over time.
Given the importance of the stock exchange industry as a key component of the
nancial market, this paper is a step forward in understanding the stock exchange
industry in relation to M&As. From a study of 31 domestic and cross-border mergers
completed between 1997 and 2011, it makes an incremental contribution to the extant
2Pagano and Padilla (2005) examine Euronext, created in 2000, from the merger between the French,
Dutch, Portuguese and Belgian stock exchanges, and nd that integration of stock exchanges produces a
number of signicant direct and indirect eciency gains (trading fees, bid-ask spreads, trading volume,
and volatility), but they do not test the eciency hypothesis directly.
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literature by examining the positive and negative impacts of stock exchange mergers on
the degree of informational eciency. We also consider a range of factors in relation to the
stock exchange merger, that can potentially aect market eciency after a merger. These
factors include the maturity of the markets being merged, the size of the markets, and
dierent types of mergers (developed markets versus mergers under-developed markets;
large stock exchange mergers versus small stock exchange mergers; and domestic stock
exchange mergers versus cross-border stock exchange mergers). For this purpose, we
evaluate time-varying return predictability using the generalized spectral shape test of
Escansiano and Velasco (2006) for the martingale dierence hypothesis (MDH), which
can capture both linear and non-linear dependence of stock returns. We use moving sub-
sample window of 3 months, which allows us to detect periods of (in)eciency, and thus
to conduct a comparative analysis for pre-merger and post-merger periods. Furthermore,
to analyze the evolution of the merger eect across the time, we take dierent lengths of
subperiods, i.e. one month, three months, six months, nine months, and twelve months.
We nd that stock exchange mergers do have an impact on the degree of informational
eciency. Firstly, our results indicate a signicant change in the level of eciency after a
stock exchange merger in most cases. Secondly, and more importantly, we nd that there
may be a ground for the concerns raised by the critics of stock exchange mergers. Indeed,
in our full sample and in most of our sub-samples (domestic pure stock exchange mergers,
cross border stock exchange mergers, domestic diversifying stock exchange mergers),
higher levels of eciency are less frequent than lower levels of eciency after a stock
exchange merger. Thirdly, we nd that the positive impact of stock exchange mergers on
the level of eciency (gain of eciency) tends to decline over time. That is, the positive
impact of a stock exchange merger is more frequent in the short term than in the long
term. Finally, we nd that the impact on the level of eciency depends on range of the
characteristics of the merger: stock exchange's level of development, size, geographical
diversication and industrial diversication.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 outlines several hypotheses
to be tested, followed by Section 3 which presents a brief discussion on testing return
predictability. Section 4 reports the empirical results, and Section 5 concludes.
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2 Hypotheses development
We focus on the mergers by stock exchanges where the bidders acquire 100% of the
target's shares. This allows us to examine the eects of an unexpected merger on the
eciency of the stocks traded on this market. It is well-known that a prior ownership
(a toehold) increases the bidder's probability of a successful full acquisition (see, for
example, Goldman and Qian, 2005). Therefore, if a stock exchange already owns a stake
in another stock exchange, the likelihood of a successful acquisition will be higher. Thus,
the stock market response to the announcement of an acquisition might be dierent
depending on whether the stock exchange has established a prior ownership or not and
on the size of this toehold. Indeed, it is possible that the pre-merger eciency of a stock
exchange is impacted by this ownership if stock exchange mergers have an impact on
eciency. To avoid this bias in the evaluation of the pre-merger eciency, it might be
better to focus on unexpected mergers, that is mergers without prior ownership by the
bidder. Our nal sample is made of 31 mergers where the bidder or the target is a stock
exchange which merged either with another stock exchange, a commodity exchange or a
services provider. In a domestic merger, the bidder and the target come from the same
country. Therefore, in a domestic merger, only the stocks listed in this country may be
impacted by the merger. In a cross-border merger, the bidder and the target come from
dierent countries. In that case, the merger could impact the eciency of the stocks
listed in the target's and in the bidder's home countries. Thus, we study the impact of
our 31 mergers on the eciency of 37 stock exchanges. Further details of theses mergers
are listed in Tables 1 and 2 of the paper.
In this section, we formulate a number of hypotheses to be empirically tested in this
paper. We consider a range of factors in relation to the stock exchange merger, that can
potentially aect the level of market eciency, after a merger. These factors include the
maturity of the markets being merged, the size of the markets, and dierent types of
mergers.
2.1 Mergers in developed vs. developing countries
The M&As can have some eects in the legal environment. When the stock exchange's
partner is located in a country with a higher investor protection, its synergy gain from
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the governance transfer will be greater (Rossi and Volpin, 2004; Bris and Cabolis, 2008;
Chari et al., 2010). Further, the conventional wisdom is that emerging markets have a
lower level of eciency than developed markets (Grin et al. 2010). If so, one might
assume that the potential for improving the level of eciency is greater for stock exchange
mergers in developing than in developed ones. Shamsuddin and Kim (2010) nd that
the degree of eciency of stock markets is negatively correlated with equity market
development. Based on this, the rst hypothesis of interest is:
Hypothesis 1: stock exchange mergers have the same impact on the level of
eciency in developing and developed countries.
Under Hypothesis 1, the frequencies of higher level of eciency in developing and
developed countries should be statistically no dierent.
2.2 Stock exchange size
Ben Slimane (2012) studied the creation of Euronext and observed a benecial impact
of the merger on stock volatility only for the Portuguese market. She explains that this
may be due to its lower size and level of development. This may suggest that the size
of stock exchange impact stock exchange merger outcomes. Therefore, it is possible that
the level of eciency improves when the merger between small stock exchanges occurs,
since the potential for improvement is greater in this case. On the other hand, the impact
of a merger by small stock exchanges may not be substantial and may have little eect
on the level of eciency.
Hypothesis 2: The size of stock exchanges plays no role in the improvement
of the degree of eciency, after the merger.
Under Hypothesis 2, the frequencies of higher level of eciency should be statistically no
dierent between the mergers of the small exchanges and large ones.
2.3 Domestic pure mergers
We dene a pure stock exchange merger as a merger between two stock exchanges
(in contrast to a merger between a stock exchange and a commodity exchange or
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a services provider). Domestic pure stock exchanges mergers should (1) simplify
trading, (2) increase liquidity and (3) consolidate the oer of domestic securities. The
improved international reputation and the easier access to information may attract some
institutional and foreign investors, with a potential to lure more companies into going
public. In that case, a higher trading volume will drive down the trading fees and thus,
may display a higher level of eciency of the stocks traded on this exchange. By contrast,
it is also possible that the stock exchange companies use their increased market power
after a merger to raise trading fees which may lead to a lower level of eciency of the
stocks traded on this exchange.
Hypothesis 3: A domestic pure stock exchange merger brings no gain in the
level of eciency
2.4 Domestic pure mergers vs. cross-border pure mergers
Cross-border business opportunities are an important driver of stock exchange consol-
idation activities (Nielsson, 2009). Technological breakthroughs, such as computerized
trading, which has lowered fees per trade, have made cross-border trading easier and thus
have created an international competition between stock exchanges to dominate trading
globally. Consistent with this view, Kokkoris and Olivares-Caminal (2008) argue that
cross-border pure stock exchange mergers aim at exploiting economies of scale in trading.
Moreover, cross-border pure stock exchanges mergers may be a way for the stock mar-
ket to improve its standing as a regional nancial center. On the other hand, a higher
level of eciency may be harder or longer to achieve in cross-border pure stock exchange
mergers than in domestic pure stock exchange mergers, because of dierences in taxation
treatments and in regulations in each country. For example, the three-way merger be-
tween the Peruvian, Colombian and Chilean stock exchanges has been disrupted by the
existence of dierent tax rates on their prots in each country, which has slowed down
the integration process.
Hypothesis 4a: A cross-border stock exchange merger has no impact on the
level of eciency.
As an alternative to Hypothesis 4a, a higher level of eciency may be displayed after a
cross-border stock exchange merger due to economies of scale in trading.
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Hypothesis 4b: A cross-border stock exchange merger and a domestic stock
exchange merger have the same impact on the level of eciency.
As an the alternative to Hypothesis 4b, a higher levels of eciency may be achieved
after a domestic stock exchange merger than after a cross-border stock exchange merger,
due to diculties in the integration process (for example, in the standardization of the
exchange rules).
By nature, in a cross-border merger, the target rm and the bidding rm come from
dierent countries. However, dierences in stock market development, such as market
integration (Hooy and Lim, 2013) or nancial liberalization (Bae et al., 2012), as well
as in corporate governance (Jin and Myers, 2006) may have an impact on stock market
eciency. If the bidder is characterized by a better market development and/or a better
corporate governance, the potential for improvement of the level of eciency may be
larger for the target than for the bidder. Conversely, the target stock exchange may be
acquired by the bidder stock exchange precisely because this acquisition will display a
higher level of eciency of the stocks listed on the bidder stock exchange. Therefore, the
merger may have a dierent impact on the eciency of the stocks listed on the target's
stock exchange and on the bidder's stock exchange.
Hypothesis 5: Neither targets nor bidders will experience a signicantly higher
level of eciency after a cross-border stock exchange merger.
When the Hypothesis 5 is rejected, there are three possible outcomes: (i) Both targets
and bidders will experience a higher level of eciency, after a cross-border stock exchange
merger; (ii) only targets will experience a higher level of eciency, after a cross-border
stock exchange merger; and (iii) only bidders will experience a higher level of eciency,
after a cross-border stock exchange merger.
2.5 Domestic pure mergers vs. domestic diversifying mergers
In recent years, stock exchanges have increasingly been diversifying their operations
into related business areas such as derivatives trading, post-trading services, and
software sales (Hasan et al., 2012b). A large number of theoretical works has been
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undertaken concerning whether or not diversifying mergers are in the best interests of
the shareholders. The M&As between the same industry benet stock exchanges more
than those between dierent industry, because more knowledge and governance transfers
will happen between two stock exchanges with the same business model (Dessein, 2005;
Gomes-Casseres et al., 2006). According to Denis et al. (1997) and Serifsoy (2007)
diversication costs outweigh the benets. Indeed, it is often dicult to produce
eciency gains when the target and the bidder do not belong to the same industry. On
the contrary, Kokkoris and Olivares-Caminal (2008) argue that the mergers combining
dierent activities (for example, a merger between a broker or a services provider and
a stock exchange) seek to provide a more comprehensive nancial service to customers
which could improve eciency.
Hypothesis 6a: The level of eciency becomes higher after a diversifying stock
exchange merger.
Hypothesis 6b: The level of eciency becomes higher after a domestic stock
exchange merger than after a diversifying stock exchange merger.
3 Testing Return Predictability
The ecient market hypothesis (EMH) of Fama (1965) states that asset prices fully and
instantaneously reect all available and relevant information. Since price adjustment to
a new piece of information is instantaneous and accurate, prices in an ecient market
follow a random walk or a martingale process. Under the weak-form eciency where the
information set consists of past prices and returns, future prices and their returns are
purely unpredictable based on past price information. Most of the studies for the EMH on
nancial markets have tested whether the returns follow a martingale dierence sequence
(MDS), where the returns are uncorrelated with the past values. For these reasons, the
return predictability has been an important issue related to the market eciency in the
weak form.
In the literature of testing for market eciency in the weak form, several alternative
tests have been used to test for martingale-dierence behavior of returns. They include
autocorrelation-based tests (Ljung and Box, 1978) and variance ratio tests (Lo and
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MacKinlay, 1988). However, these tests are are designed to capture the linear dependence
of return on its own past. Given the evidence of non-linear dependence in asset returns,
evaluation of linear dependence only may be restrictive. In this paper, we employ the
generalized spectral shape (GSS) test of Escanciano and Velasco (2006), which is capable
of detecting both linear and nonlinear dependence present in nancial time series (Lim,
2007; Lim et al., 2008; Lim and Brooks, 2010). The GSS test is constructed based on the
property that the spectral density of a MDS is at. This test can capture a wide range
of linear and non-linear dependence in mean, allowing for a general form of unknown
conditional heteroscedasticity. In a recent Monte Carlo study, Charles et al. (2011)
found that this test shows desirable size and power properties in small samples, under
a wide range of martingale processes and non-martingale alternatives. To conserve the
space, the details of the GSS test are are not given here: interested readers are pointed
to Escanciano and Lobato (2006) and Charles et al. (2011) for detailed descriptions.
4 Empirical results
4.1 Data
We use daily closing spot prices from the following stock exchange markets: Amsterdam
Stock Exchange (AEX), Australian Stock Exchange (ASX200), Bolsa de Valores de
Colombia (COLCAP), Bolsa de Valores de Lima (IGBVL), Bolsa de Santiago de
Chile (IPSA), Borsa Italiana (MIB20), Dubai Financial Market (DFM), Euronext
(Euronext100), Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE), Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange
(KLCI), Lisbon Stock Exchange (PSI20), London Stock Exchange (FTSE100), Moscow
Interbank Currency Exchange (MICEX), New York Stock Exchange (S&P500), Paris
Stock Exchange (CAC40), Sao Paulo Stock Exchange (BOVESPA), Stock Exchange
of Hong Kong (SEHK), Stock Exchange of Singapore (STI), Tokyo Stock Exchange
(NIKKEI225), Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX), and Zagreb Stock Exchange (CROBEX).
We study the impact of 31 mergers on the eciency of 37 stock exchanges. Tables
1 and 2 display the mergers between stock exchanges, between a stock exchange and
a provider of services, and between a stock exchange and a commodity exchange,
respectively. We give both the announced and eective dates of each merger, and the
name, the country and the industry of the target and the acquirer.
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We rst present descriptive statistics (mean and standard deviation) for the return
series calculated as the rst logarithmic dierence of the daily closing prices, which are
obtained from Thomson Financial Datastream, before and after the date of merger (\Date
eective") in Table 3. For the domestic M&As between stock exchanges or between stock
exchange and commodity exchange the mean returns are higher before than after the
merger in more than 50% of the mergers. For the cross-border M&As between stock
exchanges the results are mixed. Note that when the merger implies a decrease of mean
returns, there are some cases of higher volatility, in terms of standard deviation.
4.2 Details of testing procedure
The empirical analysis in this paper computes the GSS test statistic in a rolling window
framework to detect the evolving nature of linear and nonlinear predictability, and
hence changing degree of market eciency over time. We evaluate time-varying return
predictability by applying the GSS test with 3-months xed-length moving sub-sample
windows, which consists of around 66 daily observations. This length of the time window
allows us to have a reasonable balance between analyzing the eect of the merger on
the short term and desirable small-sample proprieties of the GSS test (Charles et al.,
2011). For the post-merger (pre-merger) period, the rst sub-sample window covers the
period from the date of merger to three months after (before). After the GSS test is
conducted for the rst sub-sample, the window is moved one daily observations forward
(backward), and the test statistic is recalculated. This process continues to the end of
the data points. Given that the rolling window approach is able to detect periods of
(in)eciency, the relative eciency of stock markets can be assessed by comparing the
total time periods these markets exhibit signicant linear or nonlinear serial dependence
over time (see Lim, 2007; Lim et al., 2008; Lim and Brooks, 2010).
We also conduct a comparative analysis for pre-merger and post-merger sub-periods
with an equal number of observations. To analyze the evolution of the merger eect
across the time, we take dierent lengths of subperiods, i.e. one month, three months,
six months, nine months, and twelve months. For each sub-period, we compute the
proportions of the p-values less than 0.05 (p) and the mean of the p-values (m). Let
p1 and p2 represent the sample proportions of the p-values less than 0.05 for pre- and
post-merger sub-periods, respectively; and m1 and m2 represent the sample means of
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the p-values for pre- and post-merger sub-periods, respectively. We can test individually
H0p1 : p1 = 0:05 against H1p1 : p1 > 0:05 and H0p2 : p2 = 0:05 against H1p2 : p2 > 0:05.
Rejection of H0p1 in favor of H1p1 is evidence against the MDH for the pre-merger period,
and rejection of H0p2 in favor of H1p2 is evidence against the MDH for the post-merger
period. We can also test the null hypothesis that the two population proportions and
means are equal, i.e H0p : p1   p2 = 0 and H0m : m1   m2 = 0, respectively. The
alternative hypothesis is H1p : p1   p2 < 0 (or H1p : p1   p2 > 0) for the proportions and
H1m : m1   m2 < 0 or H1m : m1   m2 > 0). To test for these hypotheses, we use the
nonparametric McNemar (1947) test for proportion comparison, and the nonparametric
Wilcoxon (1945) test for mean comparison.
Given the information above, we apply the following testing strategies:
Step 1: Individual proportion tests
{ If H0p1 and H0p2 are not rejected, then the MDH is accepted for the pre- and
post-merger periods;
{ If H0p1 is not rejected and H0p2 is rejected, then the MDH is accepted for the
pre-merger period but rejected for the post-merger period;
{ If H0p1 is rejected and H0p2 is not rejected, then the MDH is accepted for the
post-merger period but rejected for the pre-merger period;
{ If H0p1 and H0p2 are rejected, the MDH is rejected for the pre- and post-merger
periods, and we go to step 2.
Step 2: Proportion comparison test
{ If H0p is rejected against H1p (p1 p2 < 0), then both sub-periods are inecient
and the pre-merger period has a lower level of ineciency than the post-merger
period. Therefore, the merger can imply a loss of eciency;
{ If H0p is rejected against H

1p (p1 p2 > 0), then both sub-periods are inecient
and the pre-merger period has a higher level of ineciency than the post-
merger period. Therefore, the merger can imply a gain of eciency;
{ If H0p is not rejected (p1   p2 = 0), then both sub-periods are ecient, and
we go to step 3.
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Step 3: Mean comparison test
{ If H0m is rejected against H1m (m1 m2 < 0), then the pre-merger period has
a lower level of eciency than the post-merger period. Therefore, the merger
can imply a gain of eciency;
{ If H0m is rejected against H

1m (m1 m2 > 0), then the pre-merger period has
a higher level of eciency than the post-merger period. Therefore, the merger
can imply a loss of eciency.
4.3 Discussion of results
Table 4-5 summarize the results of the GSS test by displaying the proportion of the
periods of eciency according to the sub-periods (one month, three months, six months,
nine months, and twelve months), and the characteristics of mergers (developed markets
versus mergers under-developed markets; large stock exchange mergers versus small
stock exchange mergers; and domestic stock exchange mergers versus cross-border stock
exchange mergers), for all stock exchange mergers combined.3
4.3.1 General analysis
The overall analysis of the results reveals some interesting ndings. Firstly, the GSS
test shows, in most cases, a signicant evolution of the eciency of the stock prices
(Panel A Table 4). According to the GSS test, in only 29.07% of cases, the stock market
has experienced no signicant changes in eciency after a stock exchange merger. This
means that, overall, a stock exchange merger has a signicant impact on the level of
eciency. Secondly, taken globally, the result indicates that, following a stock exchange
mergers, lower levels of eciency (41.28% of the cases) are more common than higher
levels (29.65% of the cases). This result is in contrast with that of Khan and Vieto
(2012). Therefore these results cast doubt on the supposed benets of stock exchange
mergers on the eciency, and tend to be fairly consistent with the market power theory.
Thirdly, the results are conditional on the length of the subperiods since we observe a
decrease in the frequency of eciency improvements after a stock exchange merger in the
3The results for individual stock exchange mergers are available upon request.
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long term.4
4.3.2 Mergers in developed vs. developing countries
We rst test for the hypothesis that stock exchange mergers have the same impact on
the level of eciency in developing and developed countries (Hypothesis 1). We follow
the denitions of the World Economic Forum to classify the countries into developed
and developing ones (see WEF, 2012). This allows us to construct a subsample of 10
deals where a developing country's stock exchange merges with another rm (another
stock/commodity exchange or a provider of services) and a subsample of 27 deals where a
developed country's stock exchange merges with another rm. Panel B1 in Table 4 shows
that in developing countries, even if the stock market may have a higher level of eciency
in the short term after a stock exchange merger with another rm, it undoubtedly displays
a signicantly lower level of eciency in the long term.
A higher level of eciency in stock markets are more frequently observed after a stock
exchange merger in a developing country than in developed countries only in the very
short term, namely less than 1 month (Panel B2, Table 4). In all the other cases, a
higher level of eciency in stock markets are more prevalent in developed countries than
in developing countries.
To sum up, our results indicate the overall rejection of Hypothesis 1 that stock
exchange mergers have the same impact on the level of eciency in the markets of
developing and developed countries. The evidence show that, in the medium and long
terms, the impact of stock exchange mergers results more frequently in improvements
of the level of eciency in developed countries than in developing countries; while the
reverse is the case in the very short term.
4.3.3 Stock exchange size
To test for Hypothesis 2, we collect the information concerning the size of the merger
on Thompson One Banker Database. We focus only on domestic mergers and obtain
4We have tested the persistence of market reaction to analyze the potential eect that the length of
the subperiods could have on the frequency of events of varying levels of eciency in the pre and post-
merger periods. We employ the Geweke and Porter-Hudak (1983) test, but we are unable do identify
any noticeable pattern from fractional parameter estimates. The results are available upon request.
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information concerning 16 deals. We split our sample in two so that we had 8 small
mergers (average size of $26.57 million with a minimum size of $5.37 million and a
maximum size of $121 million) and 8 large mergers (average size of $934.88 with a
minimum size of $140 million and a maximum size of $2,259.09 million). The results
of Panel C1 in Table 4 display that small deals resulting in a signicantly lower level of
eciency in stock market after the merger. This is particularly so in the long term since
no small merger improves the level of eciency for a subperiod of more than 9 months.
The comparison of the results associated with small mergers with those with large
mergers oers some interesting insights (Panel C2, Table 4). Namely, large mergers tend
to result in a higher level of eciency in long term with high frequency. Our result shows
strong evidence against Hypothesis 2 that the size of stock exchanges play no role in the
improvement of the level of eciency after the merger. We nd that small stock exchange
mergers may be too small to have a higher level of eciency; while large stock exchange
mergers show a strong tendency to display a higher level of eciency.
4.3.4 Domestic pure mergers
In order to test for Hypotheses 3, we focus on the 11 domestic pure stock exchange
mergers of our sample (Panel A1, Table 5). The results show that the stock market
has a signicantly lower level of eciency after the merger than before. These results
are particularly meaningful in the debate over the impact of stock exchange mergers.
Although the results are mixed in the very short term (as many deals result in a higher
level of eciency than in a lower level of eciency one month after the merger), a lower
level of eciency is evident after the merger in the medium to long term. Therefore,
domestic mergers between two stock exchanges tend to have a negative impact on
eciency (loss of eciency), which is an evidence against Hypothesis 3.
4.3.5 Domestic pure mergers vs. cross-border pure mergers
To test for Hypotheses 4a and 4b, we focus on the six cross-border stock exchange mergers
of our sample. The results of Panel A2 in Table 5 indicate that the stocks listed on a stock
exchange display a lower level of eciency after a cross-border stock exchange merger
which invalidates Hypothesis 4a. The comparison with the results given in Panel A1
indicates that for most length of subperiods, cross-border pure stock exchange mergers
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result more frequently in a lower level of eciency than domestic pure stock exchange
mergers which contradicts Hypothesis 4b.
We have then split our sample between targets and bidders of a cross-border stock
exchange merger in order to study whether there are dierences in the changes of the
level of eciency of their stocks (Hypothesis 5). The results of Panel B in Table 5 tend to
invalidate this hypothesis. Even if the number of observations is quite low, our evidence
tends to indicate that, on the long term, both target's and bidder's stocks tend to have
a lower level of eciency after than before a cross border stock exchange.
This result is very interesting from a theoretical and policy point of view, because
it calls into question the interest of cross-border stock exchange mergers since neither
the acquirer nor the target seem to benet from this kind of mergers in term of level of
eciency. Conversely, both stock exchanges exhibit a lower level of eciency.
4.3.6 Domestic pure mergers vs. domestic diversifying mergers
Finally, we study the impact of diversifying stock exchange mergers on the level of
eciency (Panel C, Table 5). This is a test for the hypothesis that the level of eciency
will be higher after a diversifying stock exchange merger due to the creation of a more
comprehensive nancial service to customers (Hypothesis 6a). The results are somewhat
mixed. In the short to medium term, they tend to indicate a higher level of eciency;
whereas, in the long term, the results tend to indicate a lower level of eciency after a
diversifying stock exchange merger. This means that Hypothesis 6a is validated in the
short term but not in the long term.
Hypothesis 6b states that a higher level of eciency is displayed after a domestic stock
exchange merger than after a diversifying stock exchange merger due to diversication
costs. The comparison between domestic focusing and domestic diversifying stock
exchange mergers (Panel A1 and C Tables 5) seems to indicate that stock exchange's
diversication might be a factor to in attaining a higher level of eciency since
improvements in the level of eciency are more frequent after a diversifying merger
than after a focusing merger - namely, when the target and the bidder belong to the
same industry. This invalidates Hypothesis 6b.
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5 Conclusion
Given the importance of the stock exchange industry as a key component of the nancial
market, this paper is a step forward in the understanding of stock exchange industry in
the framework of M&As. This paper makes an incremental contribution to the existing
literature by examining the positive and negative impacts of stock exchange mergers
on the degree of informational eciency for these markets, an issue that is still largely
unexplored in previous academic studies. Indeed, there is currently an important debate
among practitioners; among scholars; and between advocates and opponents of stock
exchange mergers. The proponents of stock exchange mergers argue that integration
of stock exchanges produces a number of signicant direct and indirect eciency gains
such as decreases in the trading fees, in the bid-ask and the volatility of the securities
as well as increases in the trading volumes. By contrast, the critics of stock exchange
mergers generally refer to the market power theory to emphasize that the merged stock
exchanges may try to exploit monopolistic rents by increasing the trading fees which
would increase the transaction costs and thus stocks' illiquidity. Therefore, whether stock
exchange mergers have a positive or a negative impact on the level of market eciency
is a controversial issue, which should be empirically examined.
In this paper, we have studied the impact of 31 mergers on the level of eciency of 37
stock exchanges in order to ll this gap in the literature. Our results should be of interest
not only to practitioners and scholars; but also to policymakers, because our approach
allows us to compare dierent types of mergers and to study the circumstances under
which a stock exchange merger improves or deteriorates the level of eciency. Using
the generalized spectral shape test for the martingale dierence hypothesis, we nd that
stock exchange mergers do have an impact on the level of market eciency. Firstly,
our results indicate a signicant change in the level of eciency after a stock exchange
merger in most cases. Secondly, and more importantly, we nd that there may be a
ground for the concerns raised by the critics of stock exchange mergers. Indeed, in our
full sample and in most of our sub-samples (domestic pure stock exchange mergers, cross
border stock exchange mergers, domestic diversifying stock exchange mergers), higher
levels of eciency are less frequent than lower levels of eciency after a stock exchange
merger. This suggests that supervisory authorities should carefully evaluate the impact
of these mergers. Thirdly, we nd that the positive impact of stock exchange mergers on
17
the level of eciency tends to decline over time. That is, the positive impact of a stock
exchange merger (gain of eciency) is more frequent in the short term than in the long
term. This eect has to be considered by those who would measure the impact of a stock
exchange merger. Finally, we nd that the impact of the merger on the level of eciency
depends on range of the characteristics of the merger, stock exchange's country's level of
development, size, geographical diversication and industrial diversication.
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